If you’re running workloads in Oracle Cloud Infrastructure (OCI) then it’s likely you’ll be familiar with Virtual Cloud Network (VCN) resources such as Subnets, Route Tables, Gateways etc. These software defined components allow you to build networks in OCI for you to deploy and run your workloads.
When it comes to implementing network access controls, you can use Security Lists, Network Security Groups or both. They are virtual firewall features that control traffic at the packet level. I’ll be covering Network Security Group reviews in a later post as I want to focus on Security Lists, specifically how you can easily review and validate rules to ensure they align with your workload, organisational, security and compliance requirements.
Recently, Oracle rolled out the OCI Bastions service, which is designed to simplify the process of accessing instances which do not have a public IP address. They are really easy to use, with simple commands to allow access to these internal hosts… if you are using a Unix shell. Unfortunately I suffer from being quite wedded to various tools, and as a Windows user, I tend to use PuTTY to access hosts via SSH, so this blog post will detail both the OCI Bastion service in a little more detail, as well as how I continued to resist changing my old habits, and set up connections using the OCI Bastion service using a number of components of the PuTTY suite of tools.
Version 1.0.0 of the Consumer Data Right standard was released in September, and it introduces a common set of Banking APIs in line with Australian government legislation. The principles behind the standards design are very solid, though the some of the specific requirements are pretty wild and they result in a bit of rethinking of some of the classical API conventions. The most prominent example of this is the approach the CDR standards take towards ‘object identifiers’, in the ID Permanence section, and I considered the requirements for this interesting enough to spend some time thinking about and documenting.
In this context, an ‘object identifier’ refers to the way in
which you refer to an individual instance of an object from your API, such as
the ‘accountId’ in the following URI:
In this blog post we will look at what the CDR requires for these types of identifiers, and provide some sample code which implements the obfuscation requirements specified in the standard.
Oracle recently introduced a Web Application Firewall (WAF) to further enhance and secure Oracle Cloud Infrastructure offerings. The Oracle Cloud Infrastructure WAF is based on Oracle Zenedge and Oracle Dyn technologies. It inspects all traffic destined to your web application origin and identifies and blocks all malicious traffic. The WAF offers the following tools, which can be used on any website, regardless of where it is being hosted:
Over 250 robust protection rules that include the OWASP rulesets to protect against SQL injection, cross-site scripting, HTML injection, and more
In this post, I configure a set of access control WAF policies to a website. Access control defines explicit actions for requests that meet conditions based on URI, request headers, client IP address, or countries and regions.
In my previous blog posts, I have discussed the generic security concepts and Identity and Access Management in OCI. This part of the series discusses OCI Networking Service. Its concepts and best practices for securing networks in OCI.
High-throughput and reliable networking is fundamental to public-cloud infrastructure that delivers compute and storage services at scale. As a result, Oracle has invested significant innovation in Oracle Cloud Infrastructure networking to support requirements of enterprise customers and their workloads. Oracle Cloud Infrastructure regions have been built with a state-of-the-art, non-blocking Clos network that is not over-subscribed and provides customers with a predictable, high-bandwidth, low latency network. The data centers in a region are networked to be highly available and have low-latency connectivity between them.
In this post, I will go into depth on the components that make up the networking layer, and the security rules which can be applied to them.
Previously, I have discussed Oracle’s overall information security portfolio in blog entry – Oracle Information Security – Where it begins, Where it ends. It was pertaining to information security in Oracle Cloud Infrastructure – Classic and On-Premises suite of products including Identity and Access Management and Database Security.
In a series of five blog posts, I am going to cover the security concepts in Oracle Cloud Infrastructure (aka OCI or Oracle Gen-2 Cloud). The Oracle Cloud Infrastructure (OCI) is a trusted enterprise cloud platform that offers customers deep control with unmatched security. It provides Oracle customers with effective and manageable security to confidently run their mission-critical workloads and store their data.
In a recent blog post, I added a throwaway reference to the use of signed assertions as a better mechanism for interacting with the Oracle Identity Cloud Service REST APIs than the use of Client id/secret, though qualified it with ‘if you want to handle the additional complexity in your consuming client’. Reflecting upon this, I thought that perhaps it was worth trying to explain this ‘additional complexity’, since the use of signed assertions have a number of benefits; primarily that it does not require an exchange of sensitive information, as the private keys used to sign the assertion never need to leave the machine on which they are generated. In this blog post, I will delve deeper into what is required to leverage this authentication mechanism, for both clients and users.
Oracle’s Identity Cloud Service is typically associated with its role in acting as the primary identity store for Oracle’s Cloud services – acting as the gatekeeper for administrators and developers, and providing single-sign-on across Oracle services for end users. However, thanks to its API-first design, it is also very capable of acting as a headless OAuth server and user store, providing authenticated access to custom applications and APIs. When these custom applications are customer facing, you will want fine-grained control over your user experience, without them interacting with IDCS directly. In this post we will explore implementing custom user activation and password reset flows; which provides the opportunity to implement pixel perfect UIs, modify the flows for different classes of users, or just do whatever your custom application requires.
Previously in this series we have examined what is required on an Access Management side in order to support a micro-services architecture, providing services for authentication, user management, assurance, etc. In this post, we expand the scope, looking at how to enable new services to easily implement access and authorisation appropriately, as well as a discussion about how they can authenticate to each other. Ultimately the creation of a secure system involves security of all parts, not just the access management services which facilitate it, and so this post focuses upon working towards enabling that. Security is also built upon organisational culture, and while it is a little difficult to instil that through a blog post, taking steps to create a technical foundation which allows the Access Management teams to be open and collaborative instead of being the team that says ‘no’ is unlikely hinder such cultural development.
Continuing from the previous post which dealt with the core concepts around performing authentication and authorisation in a distributed environment, this post expands upon those concepts, looking at additional factors for authorisation decisions, including supplementary information, authentication challenges and risk assessment. While basic authentication and authorisation requirements can be met through the use of JWTs and OAuth, this post shifts to tackling bespoke requirements, outlining potential services which could provide capabilities above and beyond what is captured in those standards.